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however, it appears that a sizeable group of products liability plaintiffs will be left without redress."
Peter McNamara
CPLR 205(a): 6-month extension available where priorpersonalinjury action improperly brought in name of deceased plaintiff was
voluntarily discontinued without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
commence an action under CPLR 205(a)
When a timely commenced action terminates after the expiration of the statute of limitations, CPLR 205(a) provides a 6-month
extension from the time of termination to commence a new action.4 '
poisoning does not accrue until the disease manifests itself. Id. at 160-61. Similarly, in Brush
Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960), a case involving exposure to pollutants, the cause of action was held to accrue at the time the plaintiff became aware of his
injury. One court has held that, for the statute of limitations to begin to run, the plaintiff
must have knowledge of the relationship between the offense and the damages sustained. See
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963). The second circuit has
held that the plaintiff's awareness of the presence of his injury is a prerequisite to the
commencement of the statutory period. See Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d
Cir. 1960).
At least one state appears to have avoided the time of accrual controversy by statutory
enactment. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (Vernon 1952).
A lower New York court recently attempted to avoid the harshness of the injury-atinitial-exposure doctrine. In McKee v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d
814 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978), a case involving injury from exposure to asbestos, the court
held that the cause of action in strict products liability began to run on the date the injury
was diagnosed. In light of Thornton, however, it is unlikely that the McKee holding will be
sustained on appeal. See Farrell, Civil Practice- 1978 Survey of New York Law, 30 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 385, 403-04 (1979).
"' While the Thornton rule presumably allows recovery for reasonably anticipated consequential damages, see Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01,
200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936); note 15 and accompanying text supra, it ignores those cases where
injuries are unforeseeable at the time of ingestion. For example, the accrual-on-the-date-ofexposure doctrine would bar the majority of claims for damages caused by radiation exposure,
since injury in such cases typically becomes apparent long after the initial exposure. See
Estep & Van Dyke, RadiationInjuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases,
62 MicH. L. REv. 753, 758-61 (1964).
1 CPLR 205(a) provides:
(a) New action by plaintiff. If an action is timely commenced and is terminated
in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the
plaintiff, or if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series
of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that
the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement
of the prior action.
CPLR 205(a) (Supp. 1979-1980).
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Although the extension is available only where a "prior action" was,
in fact, instituted, 2 the courts and commentators disagree on the
definition of a "prior action" for purposes of the statute. 3 In an
CPLR 205(a) is essentially a reenactment of CPA § 23 and its predecessors with little
substantive change. Compare CPLR 205(a) with CPA § 23 (repealed 1963) and CODE OF Civ.
PROC. ch. 448 § 405, [1876] N.Y. LAws 74 (repealed 1920) and CODE OF PROC. (Field Code),
ch. 438, § 104, [1849] N.Y. LAWs 637 (repealed 1920). The roots of CPLR 205(a) may, in fact,
be traced to the English Limitations Act of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.16, § 4 (repealed 1939). See
Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915).
The statutory provision that the extension is not available when the prior action was
dismissed for neglect to prosecute has been held to encompass dismissals under CPLR 3216
for want of prosecution, see, e.g., Williams v. New York Ins. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 823, 174
N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958), dismissals under CPLR 3012(b) for failure to
serve a complaint, see, e.g., Schwartz v. Luks, 46 App. Div. 2d 634, 359 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st
Dep't), appealdismissed, 33 N.Y.2d 657, 303 N.E.2d 657, 348 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1973), dismissals
under CPLR 3404 for abandonment, see, e.g., Pomerantz v. Cave, 10 App. Div. 2d 569, 195
N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 914, 168 N.E.2d 837, 204 N.Y.S.2d 160
(1960); Scott v. Rosenwitz, 213 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961), and dismissals
for failure to submit to an examination before trial, see, e.g., Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 43
N.Y.2d 881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978).
It should be noted that CPLR 205(a) apparently does not apply where the previous action
was commenced outside New York in a state or federal court. See Baker v. Commercial
Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 3 App. Div. 2d 265, 161 N.Y.S.2d 332 (4th Dep't 1957), appeal
dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 828, 150 N.E.2d 233, 173 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1958) (decided under CPA § 23).
The extension is available, however, when the prior action was instituted in a federal court
in New York. See Smith v. Rensselaer County, 52 App. Div. 2d 384, 384 N.Y.S.2d 223 (3d
Dep't 1976); Park & Pollard Co. v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 197 App. Div. 671, 189 N.Y.S.
866 (1st Dep't 1921) (decided under CODE OF Civ. PROC. § 405 (repealed 1920)).
42 CPLR 205(a); note 41 and accompanying text supra; see Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296
N.Y. 68, 73, 70 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1946); Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923);
Knox v. Beckford, 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't 1939), affl'd, 285 N.Y. 762,
34 N.E.2d 911 (1941).
43 While an action dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is considered a prior
action for purposes of CPLR 205(a), see Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E.
594 (1915); Smith v. Rensselaer County, 52 App. Div. 2d 384, 384 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dep't
1976), the courts have indicated that the statute does not apply where the first action was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction caused by a defect in service. See, e.g., Smalley v.
Hutcheon, 296 N.Y. 68, 70 N.E.2d 161 (1946); Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938
(1923); Baker v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 3 App. Div. 2d 265, 161
N.Y.S.2d 332 (4th Dep't 1957); Knox v. Beckford, 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d
Dep't 1939), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 762, 34 N.E.2d 911 (1941). But see Amato v. Svedi, 35 App. Div.
2d 672, 315 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1970). In Amato, the plaintiff brought an assault action in
the Civil Court of the City of New York for an assault allegedly committed in Suffolk County
by a Suffolk County resident. Id. at 672, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 64. That action was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Id. The Amato court held that the plaintiffs subsequent action, which had been instituted within 6-months of the termination of the
prior action, was entitled to the benefits of CPLR 205(a). The court concluded that the
plaintiff's erroneous choice of forum could not preclude the application of CPLR 205(a) since
"[a] defect of this nature [must] be distinguished from a failure to achieve service of
process upon the defendant. . . . in [which] case. . . the action [would be] deemed never
to have commenced." Id. at 672, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (citation omitted).
Citing the Amato case, one commentator maintains that a dismissal for lack of personal
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effort to remove this uncertainty, the Court of Appeals, in George
v. Mt. Sinai Hospital," recently held that a personal injury action
commenced in the name of a decedent is a predicate action for the
purposes of CPLR 205(a).11
In George, a medical malpractice action was commenced in the
name of a deceased plaintiff." After the expiration of the statute of
limitations on the malpractice claim, the plaintiff's counsel served
an amended summons, substituting the administratrix as plaintiff.47 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds,
inter alia, that service of the amended summons was untimely."
The motion was withdrawn, however, when the parties stipulated
to a discontinuance of the action "without prejudice to plaintiff's
right to . . . commence any action pursuant to the authority of
Section 205 of the CPLR."45 Within 6 months of the termination, the
administratrix instituted a survival action." Arguing that an action
jurisdiction over the defendant owing to a "technical flaw" in service would not negate the
application of CPLR 205(a), provided the defendant actually receives notice. SIEGEL § 52, at
54. According to Professor Seigel, the "key inquiry" is whether the first action provided "the
defendant [with] notice within the applicable period of limitations." Id. at 53. See also 1
WK&M 205.11.
4,47 N.Y.2d 170, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979), rev'g 62 App. Div. 2d 950,
404 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1978).
4147 N.Y.2d at 180, 390 N.E.2d at 1161-62, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
41Id. at 173, 390 N.E.2d at 1157, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The decedent died, apparently
without the knowledge of her attorney, at some point between the time she had retained the
attorney for the purpose of bringing the malpractice action and the commencement of the
suit. Id. Her death, in any event, was unrelated to the injuries brming the basis for the
malpractice claim, and no wrongful death claim was ever commenced. Id.
,1Id. at 174, 390 N.E.2d at 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The plaintiffs attorney discovered
his error in time to discontinue the lawsuit and institute a timely survival action. Instead of
pursuing that approach, however, he requested the defendant to stipulate to a substitution
of the administratrix as plaintiff in the pending action. While awaiting the defendant's
response, which was in the negative, the statute of limitations expired on the malpractice
claim. Id. at 173-74, 390 N.E.2d at 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
11Id. at 174, 390 N.E.2d at 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 233. As was noted by the appellate
division in George, had the plaintiff responded that CPLR 203(e) authorized the relation back
of the amended summons to the date of service in the original action, the defendant would
have prevailed. 62 App. Div. at 950, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17. See Goldberg v. Camp MikanRecro, 42 N.Y.2d 1029, 1029-30, 369 N.E.2d 8,8-9, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009-10 (1977); note
62 infra.
1' 47 N.Y.2d at 174, 390 N.E.2d at 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 234. CPLR 3217, which governs
the voluntary discontinuance procedure, permits an action to be discontinued by service of
notice, by court order, or by filing with the clerk of the court a stipulation, signed by the
attorneys for all parties to the action. See CPLR 3217 (1970). Once the defendant answers
the complaint, however, or 20 days after service of the complaint, whichever occurs first,
discontinuance is permitted only by court order or stipulation of the parties. See id., commentary at 1005 (McKinney 1970).
47 N.Y.2d at 174, 390 N.E.2d at 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
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brought in the name of a decedent is a "nullity" and thus not a
"prior action" within the meaning of CPLR 205(a), the defendant
claimed that the statutory extension was unavailable. 1 The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was
barred by the statute of limitations was denied by the Supreme
Court, New York County.52 The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, finding the first action to have been a nullity."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an action commenced in the name of a deceased plaintiff, although subject to dismissal, is a valid prior action for the purposes of CPLR
205(a). 4 Judge Gabrielli, writing for a unanimous Court, initially
rejected the defendant's "circular" argument that a properly dismissed action is a nullity and cannot provide the basis for the CPLR
205(a) extension.5 This interpretation, according to the George
Court, "would . . . strip [CPLR 205(a)] of a major part of its
designated role."5 6 Judge Gabrielli then analyzed the fundamental
distinctions between wrongful death and survival actions com11Id. at 174-75,

390 N.E.2d at 1158-59, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 234.

52 George, 62 App. Div. 2d 950, 950, 404 N.Y.S.2d 16, 16 (1st Dep't 1978).
3Id.

47 N.Y.2d at 177-78, 390 N.E.2d at 1160-61, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36. The Court's
decision overruled Eisenthal v. Schatzberg, 39 Misc. 2d 330, 240 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1963), sub silentio. In Eisenthal, CPA § 23, the predecessor to CPLR 205(a),
see note 41 supra, was held to be unavailable where a prior action on a note, commenced in
the name of a decedent, had been dismissed. 39 Misc. 2d at 331, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
The George Court also considered whether the stipulation to discontinue the first action
precluded the application of CPLR 205(a). 47 N.Y.2d at 180-81, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 237-38. See generally note 49 and accompanying text supra.Although the statute
is expressly inapplicable where the plevious action was discontinued voluntarily, CPLR
205(a); see note 41 supra, the Court held that the stipulation did not foreclose the 6-month
extension. Finding that the parties intended to preserve the plaintiff's rights under the statute, 47 N.Y.2d at 180-81, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 238, and that the stipulation
contravened no public policy, id. at 181, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (citing John
J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 544, 389 N.E.2d 99, 415 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1979),
discussed at notes 233-261 and accompanying text infra), the Court saw no reason not to
effectuate the patent intent of the parties. 47 N.Y.2d at 181, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417 N.Y.S.2d
at 238.
There is one important caveat to the George Court's determination that a party may
stipulate to a discontinuance and still avail himself of the saving provision of CPLR 205(a).
The Court emphasized that where the stipulation fails to expressly state an intent to preserve
one's rights under CPLR 205(a), a claimant subsequently will not be able to take advantage
of the 6-month extension because, generally, the motives behind a voluntary discontinuance
are irrelevant. Id. at 180, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38; accord, Friedman v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 273 App. Div. 786, 75 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y.
702, 82 N.E.2d 791 (1948); Bannister v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 App. Div. 765, 97
N.Y.S. 843 (4th Dep't 1906), affl'd, 194 N.Y. 583, 105 N.E. 1106 (1907).
47 N.Y.2d at 176, 390 N.E.2d at 1159, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35.
"Id.
U
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menced in the names of those lacking capacity to sue.5 7 Since a
wrongful death action is entirely a creature of statute with no
common-law counterpart,-8 the requirements for maintaining the
action have been considered substantive elements of the cause of
action.59 In contrast to the wrongful death action, which has been
held not to exist until an administrator has been duly appointed and
qualified,6" the George Court observed that the survival action presupposes a valid claim by the decedent at the time of death and
merely removes the common-law bar to a suit on that claim." When
brought in the name of the deceased, therefore, it was determined
that the survival action should be dismissed but should not be
deemed a nullity for CPLR 205(a) purposes. 2 The Court concluded
that CPLR 205(a) was intended to afford the plaintiff a second
chance where a properly commenced action has been dismissed for
a reason other than a judgment on the merits or a failure to prose51Id. at 176, 390 N.E.2d at 1159, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
11Id.; see Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 570 (1861); Boffe v. Consolidated
Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, 394, 157 N.Y.S. 318, 320 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd,
226 N.Y. 654, 123 N.E. 856 (1919); EPTL 5-4.1. The Court stated that "a wrongful death
action 'is not a simple devolution of a cause of action which the deceased would have had
. . . but. . . is an entirely new cause of action.'" 47 N.Y.2d at 176, 390 N.E.2d at 1159, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 235 (quoting Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 470 (1861)).
11 47 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 390 N.E.2d at 1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 235 (citing Sharrow v. Inland
Lines, 214 N.Y. 101, 112-13, 108 N.E. 217, 220-21 (1915)).
60 Boffe v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, 394, 157 N.Y.S.
318, 320 (1st Dep't 1916), affl'd, 226 N.Y. 654, 123 N.E. 856 (1919). It is suggested that the
George Court seems to have indicated that a wrongful death action instituted in the name of
the deceased mrght not be a prior action within the meaning of CPLR 205(a). See also notes
64-71 and accompanying text infra.
, 47 N.Y.2d at 177, 390 N.E.2d at 1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 235; see EPTL § 11-3.2.
" 47 N.Y.2d at 177-79, 390 N.E.2d at 1160-61, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236. Judge Gabrielli
distinguished the present case from the situation involved in Goldberg v. Camp Mikan-Recro,
42 N.Y.2d 1029, 369 N.E.2d 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1977). In Goldberg, the plaintiff commenced a wrongful death action in his own name for damages caused by the death of his son.
Id. at 1029, 369 N.E.2d at 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1008. After the statute of limitations had run
on the wrongful death claim, the plaintiff was appointed administrator of his son's own estate.
Id. He then served an amended summons and complaint substituting himself in his administrative capacity as plaintiff. Id. Since the prior action was brought in the name of an improper
plaintiff, the Goldberg Court held that the amended summons and complaint could not relate
back to the original pleadings, see CPLR 203(e), because "there was no pre-existing action
to which it could 'relate back.'" 42 N.Y.2d at 1029-30, 369 N.E.2d at 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1009
(citing Vastola v. Maer, 39 N.Y.2d 1019, 355 N.E.2d 300, 387 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976); Caffaro
v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974)).
The George Court stated that, in contrast to CPLR 205(a), CPLR 203(e) applies only
where there is a valid preexisting action. 47 N.Y.2d at 179-80, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 237. "Moreover," stated the Court, "there is a fundamental difference between
an action for wrongful death and an action which survives the death of the injured party."
Id. at 180, 390 N.E.2d at 1161-62, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 237. See generally notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
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cute, and the
defendant has been given timely notice of the claim
63
against him.

While the George decision comports with the principles underlying CPLR 205(a), its implication that a wrongful death action,
instituted in a non-representative capacity, might not be a prior
action under CPLR 205(a) seems questionable. 4 If a party timely
institutes both a survival action and a wrongful death action prior
to his appointment as personal representative of the decedent, and
the defendant moves to dismiss after the statute of limitations has
expired, 5 the survival action may be salvaged by invoking CPLR
205(a).11 The George decision, however, indicates that a similar extension, premised on the wrongful death action, should not apply
to the wrongful death claim."7 Nevertheless, since both claims arise
out of the same "transaction or occurrence,""8 the wrongful death
action apparently could be based on the prior survival action and
thereby obtain the benefit of the 6-month extension.69 In contrast,

1147 N.Y.2d at 178-79, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37. In Gaines v. City of
New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915), Judge Cardozo explained the purpose of a
precursor to CPLR 205(a) in the following manner:
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court
till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be
frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is that by
invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a present
purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.
Id. at 539, 109 N.E. at 596.
The George Court concluded by observing that CPLR 205(a) generally requires the parties to each action be the same. Id. at 179, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 237. Accord,
Streeter v. Graham & Norton Co., 263 N.Y. 39, 188 N.E. 150 (1933); Breen v. State, 179 Misc.
42, 37 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1942). Where, however, the plaintiff in the second action is suing
as the representative of the claimant in the prior action, and the claim is the same, the Court
found no conflict with the statute. 47 N.Y.2d at 179, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at
237; cf.Van der Stegen v. Neuss, Hesslein & Co., 270 N.Y. 55, 200 N.E. 577 (1936) (plaintiff's
trustees in bankruptcy added as plaintiffs in second action); Mehrer v. North Ninth Lumber
Co., 195 Misc. 566, 90 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), affl'd, 275 App. Div. 1059, 92
N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1949) (plaintiff suing in his representative capacity in second action).
" See note 60 supra. See generally 47 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 390 N.E.2d at 1159-60, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 235.
1 This factual situation is not uncommon. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Camp Mikan-Recro,
42 N.Y.2d 1029, 369 N.E.2d 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1977); Mogavero v. Stony Creek Dev.
Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899 (4th Dep't 1976).
1147 N.Y.2d at 180, 390 N.E.2d at 1161-62, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
' But see cases cited in note 69 infra.
U See CPLR 205(a), commentary at 55 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
" Indeed, several cases have either held or suggested, without considering whether the
prior action was a "nullity," that CPLR 205(a), or a predecessor, could be used to save a
wrongful death claim in such circumstances. See, e.g., Mogavero v. Stoney Creek Dev. Corp.,
53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899 (4th Dep't 1976); Mehrer v. North Ninth Lumber
Co., 275 App. Div. 1059, 92 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1949); Boffe v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec.
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if only a wrongful death claim is asserted in the first action, 0 George
indicates that CPLR 205(a) may not be invoked to save the claim.'
It seems anomalous that a plaintiff may save his wrongful death
claim by compounding his error in the first complaint.
It is submitted that this unfortunate result stems from confusing a wrongful death claim's substantive elements and its procedural time limitations.72 In deciding the CPLR 205 procedural issue,
the George Court appears to have invoked the same reasoning that
was used to dismiss the original action - a decision based on a
question of substantive law. A wrongful-death action plaintiff, however, whether proper or improper, should be entitled to the tolls and
extensions given by Article 2 of the CPLR.73 Moreover, it is submitted that the George Court could have arrived at the same result had
its inquiry been limited to whether the plaintiff in the second action
had a sufficient identity of interest with the first named plaintiff
and whether the previous action gave the defendant notice of the
claim.74
The George opinion further suggests continued adherence to the
common-law rule that an action dismissed for defective service of
process cannot be a prior action on which to establish the statutory
extension. 75 In dictum, the George Court indicated its disapproval
of the notion that this rule is premised on the assumption that one
of the major purposes of the statute, notice to the defendant, is not
satisfied where an action is commenced by improper service." To
Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, 157 N.Y.S. 318 (1st Dep't 1916), affl'd, 226 N.Y. 654, 123 N.E.
856 (1919).
11 See, e.g., Mehrer v. North Ninth Lumber Co., 275 App. Div. 1059, 92 N.Y.S.2d 178
(2d Dep't 1949); Boffe v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, 157
N.Y.S. 318 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 654, 123 N.E. 856 (1919).
7, See generally 47 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 390 N.E.2d at 1159-60, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
72 It long has been recognized that the statute of limitations on a wrongful death claim

is merely "a procedural limitation on the remedy and not part of the substantive right" to
bring the action. Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 249, 319 N.E.2d 174, 175, 360 N.Y.S.2d
847, 849 (1974); Sharrow v. Inland Lines, 214 N.Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915).
71 See, e.g., Streeter v. Graham & Norton Co., 263 N.Y. 39, 188 N.E. 150 (1933); Mogavero v. Stoney Creek Dev. Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899 (4th Dep't 1976);
McDonough v. Cestare, 3 App. Div. 2d 201, 159 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d Dep't 1957); Hoffman v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 163 App. Div. 50, 148 N.Y.S. 509 (3d Dep't 1914); CPLR art. 2.
11If the Court's comparison of the survival and wrongful death actions is excised from
the opinion, then the applicability of CPLR 205(a) turns only upon a resolution of the party
and notice issues. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
13Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296 N.Y. 68, 73, 70 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1946) (decided under CPA
§ 23 (repealed 1963)); Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 416, 140 N.E. 938, 939 (1923) (decided
under CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 405 (repealed 1920)); see note 41 supra.
71 47 N.Y.2d at 178, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The proponents of this
theory suggest that if the defendant receives notice and the defect in service is "technical"
and goes only to the method, CPLR 205(a) should provide the extension. See SIEGEL § 52, at
54; note 43 supra.
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the contrary, the Court maintained that actual notice should be
irrelevant since the common-law exception to the applicability of
the statutory extension is based upon the theory that no prior action
was commenced if service was bad.7 1 Yet, in allowing the plaintiff
in George an extension under CPLR 205(a), the Court seems to have
relied upon the fact that the summons, although defective, fully
apprised the defendant of the pending suit.7 8 It is suggested that the

applicability of CPLR 205(a) should not hinge on the nature of the
defect in the prior action, nor on whether the first action was
"commenced." Rather, it is submitted that actual notice and vigorous prosecution of the first claim should suffice to invoke the stat71

ute.

Frank F. Coulom, Jr.

ARTICLE

3

-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT

CPLR 308(4): Fourattempts to serve the defendantpersonally during business hours does not constitute due diligence
CPLR 308(4) permits substituted service of a summons upon a

natural person where the preferred methods, personal service or
delivery "to a person of suitable age and discretion" at the defendant's business or dwelling place and mailing to his last known
" 47 N.Y.2d at 178, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The Court noted the
"actual notice" rationale was inconsistent with its decision in Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296 N.Y.
68, 70 N.E.2d 161 (1946). 47 N.Y.2d at 178, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236. In
Smalley, the plaintiffs commenced a negligence action in an Illinois state court against the
personal representative of the alleged tortfeasor for injuries suffered in an Illinois car accident.
296 N.Y. at 70, 70 N.E.2d at 161. Attempting to effect service pursuant to Illinois' nonresident
motorist statute, the plaintiffs served the Secretary of State of Illinois and mailed a copy to
the administrator of the deceased defendant. Id. at 70-71, 70 N.E.2d at 161-62. That action
was dismissed because Illinois' nonresident motorist statute did not authorize service of
process on the personal representative of a nonresident motorist in an action against the
motorist's estate. Id. at 71, 70 N.E.2d at 162. After the Illinois 2-year statute of limitations
had expired, the plaintiffs brought suit against the administrator in a New York court. Id.
From these facts, it appears that the defendant-administrator had actual knowledge of the
claim against his intestate. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of its decision in
Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1928), held that a similar extension provided
by the laws of Illinois did not apply because "no action [had been] commenced" in Illinois.
296 N.Y. at 73, 70 N.E.2d at 163.
' See 47 N.Y.2d at 177-78, 390 N.E.2d at 1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
7, See Gaines v. City of. New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 539, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (1915); notes
43, 62 & 76 supra.

